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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the impact of tax asymmetries (the lack of full
loss offsets) under current corporate income tax law and a stylized tax reform
proposal. The government's tax claim on the firm's pretax cash flows is
modelled as a series of path-dependent call options and valued by option
pricing procedures and Monte Carlo simulation.
The tax reform investigated reduces the statutory tax rate, eliminates the
investment tax credit and sets tax depreciation approximately equal to
economic depreciation. These changes would increase the effective tax rate on
marginal investments by firms that always pay taxes, but dramatically reduce
the potential burden of tax asymmetries. Stand-alone' investments, which are
exposed to the greatest burden, are uniformly more valuable under this reform,
despite the loss of the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation.
These general results are backed up by a series of numerical experiments.
We vary investment risk, inflation (with and without indexing of tax
depreciation), and investigate how allowing interest on loss carryforwards
would affect after-tax project value.
1. Introduction1
Under current (1985) law, corporate income is taxed only when positive.
Although losses can be carried back to generate tax refunds up to the amount
of taxes paid in the previous three years, losses must be carried forward once
these tax refunds are used up. The present value per dollar carried forward
is less than the statutory rate for two reasons: (1) the firm may not earn
enough to use the carry-forwards before they expire, and (2) carry-forwards do
not earn interest.
In previous work, Majd and Myers (1985), we showed that tax asymmetries
can be modelled and valued as contingent claims, using option pricing theory
combined with Monte Carlo simulation. Although the asymmetries' effects
cannot be expressed in conventional summary measures such as effective tax
rates, we did work out impacts on the after-tax net present values (NPVs) of
incremental investment outlays. Tax asymmetries can dramatically reduce
after-tax NPVs for high-risk investments, although the extent of reduction
depends on the tax position of the investing firm. Tax asymmetries are
irrelevant at the margin for a firm with sufficient other income that it
always pays taxes on a marginal dollar of income or loss. Asymmetries may be
the dominant tax effect for "stand-alone" projects, that is, for cases where
the project and the firm are the same.
Here we focus on the design of the corporate income tax. We report the
results of a series of numerical experiments comparing current (1985) tax law
with a stylized tax "reform" proposal, with tax asymmetries of course
emphasized. In doing so we have also improved the methods we used previously,
notably by using more realistic and consistent numerical parameters.
We have also included an intelligent, although not fully optimal, project
abandonment strategy in the simulations. The abandonment strategy links
project life to ex post profitability. We constructed this link because
fixing project life ex ante does not make sense under uncertainty, and because
the extent to which tax loss carry-forwards can relieve tax asymmetries ought
to depend on decisions about project life.
The next section briefly reviews prior work by others. Section 3
describes how option pricing concepts can be applied to value the government's
tax claim on risky assets. Since no closed-form option pricing formulas
apply, values must be computed by numerical methods. Section 3, backed up by
an Appendix, also describes our calculations in more detail and presents
after-tax values for a reasonably realistic 'representative project' under
various assumptions about project profitability, risk and the tax position of
the firm owning it. Section 4 investigates how the impact of tax asymmetries
changes when a stylized, reformed tax system is substituted for the 1985
corporate tax law. Section 5 offers some concluding comments.
2. Prior Work
Formal analysis of the impacts of asymmetric taxation is just beginning
to appear in the finance literature. For example, Cooper and Franks (1983)
recognize that the firm's future tax rates are endogenous under asymmetric
taxation with carry forward privileges. They use a linear programming
framework to analyze the interaction between present and future investment and
financing decisions induced by the tax system. They discuss some of the
factors that limit financial transactions designed to offset tax losses, and
conclude that real investment by corporations can be distorted.
Ball and Bowers (1983), Galai (1983), Smith and Stultz (1983), Pitts and
Franks (1984), and Green and Talmor (1985) all have noted the analogy between
asymmetric taxes and call options. However, none of these papers has
introduced realistic elements of the law, such as tax loss carry provisions,
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nor have they obtained numerical estimates of the impact of tax asymmetries on
asset values.
Building on earlier work in Auerbach (1983), Auerbach and Poterba (1986)
investigate the effects of tax asymmetries on corporate investment
incentives. They take the tax position of the firm as exogenous, and use
estimates of the tax losses carried forward by a sample of corporations to
estimate the probability that the firm will pay taxes in the future. They
compute effective marginal tax rates on new investment using these "transition
probabilities."
The assumption that the future tax position of the firm is exogenous may
be reasonable for incremental investment decisions that are small compared to
the other assets of the firm. However, this approach cannot handle investment
decisions when the project must "stand alone," or when it is a significant
part of the assets of the firm. Moreover, as Auerbach and Poterba note, using
past data on tax loss carry forwards will not allow them to analyze proposed
changes in tax law, since the change in tax regime will also change the
transition probabilities that they estimate.
By contrast, we take future pre-tax cash flows of the firm or project as
completely exogenous, and thus can allow the future tax position of the firm
or project to be completely endogenous. This approach can shed light on
effects of proposed changes corporate tax law.
3. Taxes As Contingent Claims
In the absence of tax loss carry backs or carry forwards, the
government's tax claim is equivalent to a portfolio of European call options,
one on each year's operating cash flow. The heavy line in Figure 1 shows
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taxes paid as a function of taxable income in a given year, and has the same
shape as a call option's payoff at exercise.
This option payoff function also describes the taxes paid on the income
of a stand-alone project (i.e., taxes paid by a firm undertaking only one
project). But in general the taxes paid on a project's income depend on the
tax position of the firm owning it. Suppose the project is owned by IBM. It
seems safe to say that IBM will not have tax loss carry forwards at any time
in the foreseeable future, and will pay taxes at the margin at the full
statutory rate. Thus, any project losses can be offset against IBM's other
income. The tax system is symmetrical for IBM when it considers an
incremental capital investment project.
We can express these option analogies more formally. Consider a project
that is the firm's only asset. Let the pre-tax operating cash flow and
depreciation allowance at time t be t and dt respectively. Ignore for now
the investment tax credit (ITC), and assume that the project is all-equity
financed. In the absence of tax loss carry forwards or carry backs, the
project's after-tax cash flow at time t is:
ct = Yt - T max[yt dt, O] 
The after-tax cash flow is the difference between the pre-tax operating cash
flow and the government's claim on it. The government's claim is equivalent
to T European call options on the operating cash flow with exercise prices
equal to the depreciation allowances.
Since the government taxes the firm's total income, the incremental
impact of a new project on the value of the firm depends on the operating cash
flows of the firm's existing assets and on their correlation with project cash
flows. The after-tax cash flow for the firm and project is:
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Ct = (Yt + zt) - max[(yt + zt) - (dt + dt)' Oj ,
where zt is the operating cash flow and dzt the depreciation allowance for the
firm without the new project. Because the government's claim is an option,
the value of the tax claim on the sum of t and t is not the sum of the
values of the tax claims on each taken separately.
Tax loss carry privileges do not change the shape of the contingent tax
payment drawn in Figure 1. If the firm does not begin paying taxes until that
year's taxable income exceeds cumulative tax losses carried forward from
previous years, the vertical dividing line shifts to the right. Carry backs
shift the horizontal dividing line down from zero by the sum of taxes paid
over the last three years.
Again we can state this formally. Consider the case of unlimited carry
forwards (but without any carry backs). The tax loss carried forward to time
t from the previous period is
t = maxlet-1 + dt-1 ' Yt-l, O]
The carry forward depends on the carry forward in the previous period which in
turn depends on the still-earlier carry forward, and so on. The carry forward
at the beginning of the project (time zero) is given. The after-tax cash flow
becomes:
ct = t - T max[yt - dt - t' O]
Since t depends on all realized incomes prior to time t, the payoff to the
government (i.e., the tax paid) also depends on the realized incomes. It is
straightforward to introduce the ITC and carry backs, and to limit the length
of time allowed for carry forwards.
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The carry privileges do not break the correspondence between the
government's tax claims and a series of call options. The government holds a
lottery across many possible options on t. Which option it ends up with
depends on the firm's history of operating cash flow, y, yl, . . "Yt_-l
This particular form of path-dependency makes it infeasible to use closed-form
option valuation formulas.
Therefore, with carry-forwards and carry-backs, developing comparative
statics is a numerical rather than analytical exercise. However, despite the
complexity of the government's contingent claim, we have found no instances in
which carry privileges reverse the normal properties of call options. For
example, we have always found that the present value of the government's tax
claim on a stand-alone project increases with project risk, defined as the
variance rate at which cash flows evolve, and also with project life. The
government is better off if nominal interest rates increase, even if tax
depreciation is indexed to inflation. Of course, all of these results can be
shown analytically, using the Black-Scholes (1973) formula, if carry
privileges are ignored and the government's tax claim is modelled as a series
of non-interacting calls, one for each year's cash flow.
3.1. Valuing the Government's Tax Claim
This section describes the numerical procedure used to calculate the
present value (to the corporation) of the taxes paid on a risky project. Our
discussion will be restricted to finding the present value of the taxes paid
on an operating cash flow in year t, t, in the presence of unlimited carry
forwards. The present value of the taxes paid on the stream of operating cash
flows is simply the sum of the values of the claims on each future year's
operating income. Extension of the procedure to include carry backs and to
limit the carry forward period is straightforward.
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We exploit a general property of options first explicitly noted by Cox
and Ross (1976): if the payoff to the option can be replicated by a portfolio
strategy using traded securities, the present value of the option is the
expected payoff forecasted under a risk-neutral stochastic process
(conditional on the current values of the relevant state variables) and
discounted at the risk free rate. In other words, the option can be valued as
if both it and the underlying asset are traded in a risk neutral world.
The reason this risk neutral valuation principle works is that options
are not valued absolutely, but only relative to the underlying asset. For
example, the Black-Scholes (1973) formula establishes only the ratio of call
value to stock price. The stock price is marked down for risk because
investors discount forecasted dividends at a risk-adjusted rate. The markdown
of the stock to a current, certainty equivalent value marks down the call
value too, but not the ratio of call value to stock price.
The call is in fact riskier than the stock it is written on, and if at
any instant investors demand an expected rate of return above the risk-free
rate to hold the stock, they will demand a still higher return to hold the
call. Suppose the required rate of return on the stock shifts up by enough to
reduce the stock price by one percent. Then the call value will fall by more
than one percent. However, the change in the stock's required return is not
needed to calculate the fall in the call price. The change in stock price is
a sufficient statistic.
Of course, the assets and options we are analyzing here are not
explicitly traded. That may seem to violate a central assumption of the
Black-Scholes model and its progeny. But we have actually taken only a small
step away from the standard finance theory of capital investment under
uncertainty. That theory assumes the firm maximizes market value, which in
-7-
turn requires capital markets sufficiently complete that investors can find a
security or portfolio of securities to "match" any investment project the firm
may embark on. For every real asset, there must be a trading strategy using
financial assets that generates a perfect substitute for the project in time
pattern and risk characteristics of future cash returns. That assumption is
routinely made for publicly traded firms. Incomplete markets are usually
treated as a second- or third-order problem in light of the exceedingly rich
menu of financial assets and trading strategies.
If investors can replicate real investment projects by trading in
financial assets, they can also replicate options written on those projects by
trading in the replicating assets and borrowing or lending. The heart of the
classic Black-Scholes (1973) paper is the demonstration that a call's payoff
can be exactly matched by a strategy of buying the underlying stock on margin,
according to a hedging rule for the amount of stock held and the margin amount
at each instant. Hedging rules can be written down for more complex or
compound options. Thus, if markets are complete enough to support a market
value standard for real assets, they are complete enough to support use of
option pricing theory.
There are other 'ways of Justifying option pricing techniques for options
on non-traded assets. For example, the techniques also follow in the
traditional capital asset pricing framework provided that asset returns are
multivariate normal and there is a representative investor with constant
absolute risk aversion.2
3.2. Solution Techniques
The path dependencies in our problem rule out closed form solutions for
the value of the government's tax claim. Moreover, these path dependencies
would overwhelm the usual numerical option-valuation routines.
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Fortunately, the rules for computing taxes are exogenous. Future tax
payments are always unknown, but there are no decisions to be made about
taxes. If the firm has the opportunity to use carry backs or carry forwards,
it does so at the first opportunity.3 As far as taxes and carry privileges
are concerned, the firm faces only an event tree, not a decision tree.
We can therefore employ a Monte Carlo simulation technique to approximate
the distribution of the payoff conditional on the prior sequence of operating
cash flow.4 The rule determining the carry back or carry forward at any time
(the path dependent feature in this problem) is specified exogenously, and
depends only on past realizations of the operating cash flow. The Monte Carlo
simulation technique exploits this feature of the problem by simulating the
sequence of cash flows. Each time a value is generated for the cash flow yt,
the tax liability in t and any carry forward to period t+l are completely
determined.
The simulation must also update the distributions of future cash flows
every time a value is generated. Different assumptions about the stochastic
process generating the time series of operating cash flow are possible. In
our calculations, we break down operating cash flow as:
Operating cash flow = Net revenues - Fixed costs ,
Yt = Xt - FCt,
where 'net revenues' means revenues less variable costs. We assume FCt is
known with certainty, and that the stochastic processes generating each year's
net revenue are perfectly correlated lognormal diffusions. That is, the
forecast error in any one year's net revenue causes the same proportional
change in the expectations of all future net revenues, and the same
proportional change in the present value of each year's future net revenues.
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If this assumption seems unduly restrictive, note that it is the usual
Justification for using a single risk-adjusted rate to discount a stream of
cash flows. Thus it implicitly underlies standard practice.5
The world of the simulation, however, is risk neutral. Here is an
example of how forecasting and discounting work in that world. Suppose
forecasted net revenues grow at a rate g and are properly discounted at a rate
r + p, where r is the risk-free interest rate and p is a risk premium:
H x
V 0= I xO e-(r+p-g)dt 0 (1 - -H
0 O r+p-g
In the risk-neutral world of the simulation, discounting is at r but the
growth rate is reduced to g g - p. Note that this does not change the
present value calculated just above: g could be interpreted as a certainty
equivalent growth rate. This rate g would be used in the simulation.
By generating a large number of simulated cash flows, an approximate
distribution for the government's tax payment in each year is obtained. The
expected value is computed and discounted at the riskless rate to obtain the
present value of the payment. The present value of the government's claim on
the project is the sum of the present values of the claims on individual cash
flows.
3.3. Limitations of Monte Carlo Simulation for Tax Analysis
Our method is limited because it cannot capture possible links between
the future tax position of the firm and its investment and financing
decisions.
Our numerical procedure must take project and firm cash flows as
exogenous. We do not consider whether a future tax loss on a project
undertaken today will affect future investment decisions. We also rule out
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cases in which today's project is managed differently, depending on its (or
the firm's) tax position. This is undoubtedly unrealistic. For example, an
otherwise profitable firm might find it less painful to stick with a losing
project in order to establish an immediate tax loss, for the same reason that
investors in securities often find it worthwhile to realize capital losses
before the end of the tax year. 6
This is one of several ways a firm can react to tax asymmetries. Four
additional examples are: (1) the firm may change its accounting policies to
shift taxable income over time; (2) the firm may seek to acquire another firm
that has taxable income; (3) the firm may choose to 'sell' its tax shields to
another firm by means of a leasing arrangement;7 (4) the firm may issue equity
and buy bonds in order to generate taxable income.8
We admit that our results are uninteresting if firms can cash in tax
losses at or near face value by these or other transactions. The transactions
are not costless, however, and in many cases fall far short of exhausting the
entire tax loss. Auerbach and Poterba (1986) find that the percentages of a
large sample of nonfinancial corporations with tax loss carryforwards ranged
from about 7 (1981) to 14 (1984). In some industries the percentages were
substantially higher. For example, 30 percent of airline companies had loss
carryforwards in 1981 and 40 percent in 1984. They also find that once a firm
falls into loss carryforwards, there is less than a 10 percent chance of
climbing out in the following year.9 If "selling tax losses" was feasible for
these firms, the selling price was not attractive for 90 percent of them.
Our analysis, since it assumes operating cash flows are exogenous, gives
a lower bound on after-tax project value and an upper bound on the impact of
tax asymmetries. 10 It shows the potential gain from changing financing or
investment decisions to shift taxes over time or between firms. Since we do
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not analyze these tax-shifting decisions specifically, we cannot give point
estimates of the impact of tax asymmetries under current law. We can make
useful comparisons of corporate tax reform proposals, however. If the
potential cost of tax asymmetries is reduced under a new tax law, that law is
better than the old one, other things equal, because it reduces the real costs
firms are willing to incur to sell carryforwards, and because tax asymmetries
are less likely to distort real investment decisions.
3.4. Example of Numerical Results
Table 1 and Figure 2 show results for the base-case project which is
described in detail in the Appendix. The project offers exponentially
decaying net revenues, moderate fixed costs, and under certainty would have an
economic life of 12 years. Inflation is i = .06 and the nominal risk free
rate is r = .08. The standard deviations of annual forecast errors for
project cash flow are x = .15, .10 and .25. In this section, we discuss and
plot NPVs only for the base case x = .15.
Four sets of numbers are shown in the table and plotted in the figure.
These correspond to various extreme assumptions about the firm undertaking the
project.
Suppose the project is owned by a firm such as Penn Central with such
large tax loss carry'forwards that we may assume a zero effective tax rate on
new projects. We will use ZEROTAX as a label for this extreme case in which
pre-tax and after-tax NPV are the same.
At the other extreme, we can imagine the standard project undertaken by a
firm taxed symmetrically on marginal investment because it is sure to pay
taxes at the margin at the full statutory rate. We label this case SYMTAX.
The NPVs in-Table 1 are calculated under a stylized tax reform law, with
indexed, exponential tax depreciation to scrap value at the end of the
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project's or asset's economic life. The tax rate is T = .33. There is no
investment tax credit. The Appendix reviews tax and numerical assumptions in
more detail.
The project's values under ZEROTAX and SYMTAX provide two extreme
cases. A third extreme case occurs when the firm and the project are the
same. Tax asymmetries have their maximum impact for stand-alone projects. Of
course, carry backs and carry forwards mitigate the effects of the
asymmetry. We assume three-year carry backs and 15 year carry forwards (i.e.,
the current (1985) system). Results for stand-alone projects are labelled
ASYMTAX. The ASYMTAX NPVs shown under "Reform" in Table 1 are also plotted in
Figure 2.
The remaining numbers in Table 1 and Figure 2, labelled NOCARRY, show the
after-tax NPV of the stand-alone project with no carryforwards or carrybacks
of losses allowed. Figure 2 shows that the NOCARRY NPVs are, as expected,
somewhat worse than the ASYMTAX NPVs. Although carry privileges are valuable,
they do not solve the tax asymmetry problem. We will not plot or comment on
NOCARRY NPVs in the rest of the paper.
Stand-alone project NPV (ASYMTAX) is always lower than either pre-tax NPV
or NPV under a symmetric tax. A firm forced to take a negative NPV project
would prefer a symmetric tax if it had the choice; second choice is no tax at
all. A firm with a strongly positive NPV project would prefer no tax, but
second choice is a symmetric tax. At some pre-tax NPV around zero, the firm
is indifferent between no tax and symmetric tax. But the asymmetric tax is
always in third place from the firm's point of view. It is farthest behind
when pre-tax NPV is about zero.
In other words, if the firm must have unused tax loss carryforwards, it
is better to have a lot of them, so that incremental investments effectively
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escape tax. The present value of the government's tax claim on a firm or
stand-alone project is greatest when it is not known whether the firm or
project will have to pay taxes.
Most of the following discussion focuses on experiments where NOTAX or
SYMTAX NPVs are not too far away from zero. Tax law is most likely to affect
decisions about breakeven or near-breakeven investments. Investments with
high positive or negative NPVs will be taken or rejected regardless of tax.
4. Tax Asymmetries and Tax Reform
So far we have confirmed the results of our prior work, that tax
asymmetries can have a significant impact on the after-tax value of
incremental investment. Now we arrive at the main goal of this paper, which
is to compare the potential impacts of tax asymmetries under current (1985)
tax law with their impacts under a reformed law with lower marginal rates,
exponential depreciation approximating economic depreciation, and no
investment tax credit.
Compare the after-tax NPVs shown under "Reform" in Table 2 with the
after-tax NPVs under current law, shown on the right of the table under
"ACRS." The comparisons are easier to grasp in Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C, which
plot after-tax NPVs for SYMTAX and ASYMTAX against pretax project
profitability measured by ZEROTAX NPV. Each figure shows NPVs for a different
standard deviation of project cash flows.
For a firm facing symmetric taxation on marginal investments, reform
reduces after-tax NPV when pretax NPV is negative or moderately positive.
This reflects the loss of the investment tax credit and accelerated
depreciation. Such a firm is better off when it finds projects with strong
positive NPVs, however, because reform lowers the marginal tax rate.
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Reform decreases the present value of taxes on stand-alone projects,
except at large negative pre-tax NPVs. In those cases, the project is
abandoned almost immediately, before any taxes are paid under either the
current or reformed tax rules. Notice that the ASYMTAX NPVs equal the NOTAX
NPVs in the top row of the base case and low-risk blocks of Table 2.
SYMTAX and ASYMTAX NPVs are equal at very high pre-tax NPVs, not shown in
Table 2 and off-scale in Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C. When the stand-alone project
is so profitable that it always pays taxes, tax asymmetries are irrelevant.
But in the interesting cases where pre-tax NPV is moderately positive or
negative, stand-alone projects are worth more under reform despite the loss of
the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation. They are worth more
relative to projects taxed symmetrically or not taxed at all.
These conclusions hold over a range of cash flow standard deviations, as
Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C illustrate. We have also checked to confirm that they
hold for projects with faster and slower tax and economic depreciation, and
that they hold when the option to shorten or extend project life is "turned
off" and project life is fixed at what it would be under certainty.
4.1. Indexing depreciation.
Table 3 and Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C show NPVs when reform does not include
indexed tax depreciation. (The definitions of indexed and non-indexed
depreciation are reviewed in the Appendix.) The format is identical to Table
2 except that cash flow standard deviation is held at x = .15 and the
inflation rate is varied from .06 (the base case) to .12 and zero. Note that
the "Reform" NPVs calculated under zero inflation match the base case NPVs in
Table 2, except for minor numerical errors introduced by the Monte Carlo
simulation.
-15-
Without indexing higher inflation naturally means lower after-tax NPVs.
Otherwise the patterns we noted in Table 2 remain in Table 3. Reform hurts
symmetrically-taxed projects when pre-tax NPV is below or around zero, but
helps when pre-tax NPV is strongly positive. Stand-alone projects are uni-
formly helped, both absolutely and relative to symmetrically-taxed projects.
4.2. Paying interest on tax loss carryforwards.
Paying interest on tax loss carryforwards is a natural remedy for tax
asymmetries. However, it is not necessarily a complete remedy. Paying
interest on carryforwards works if the firm is sure to pay taxes eventually.
If not, the government's option retains value, just as a call option does if
the exercise price increases at the interest rate.
Table 4 and Figure 5 show the extent to which the remedy works. Even
with interest on carryforwards, there is a gap between ASYMTAX and SYMTAX
NPVs. Consider the base-case project at a profitability level yielding a pre-
tax NPV of 7.97 and an after-tax NPV under symmetric taxation of 3.21. (See
the top block of numbers in Table 4.) Allowing interest on carryforwards
increases ASYMTAX NPV from 1.05 to 1.19. This represents an improvement, but
does not elimiate the effects of the asymmetry. Allowing interest on
carryforwards makes less difference (compared to reform without interest) when
pre-tax value is very low (i.e., ASYMTAX approaches ZEROTAX) or very high
(i.e., ASYMTAX approaches SYMTAX).
The other two panels in Table 4 show the impact of interest on
carryforwards when inflation is zero or 12 percent: allowing interest makes a
bigger difference to ASYMTAX NPV when inflation is high, but the effect of the
asymmetries remains.
Allowing interest on loss carryforwards completely removes the burden of
tax asymmetries only if the stand-alone firm or project is certain to regain
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tax-paying status sooner or later. But on this point full certainty requires
immortality for the firm or project and no limit on the carry-forward
period. In our simulations the investment project may live to year
100--probably a good approximation of immortality--but it may be abandoned
much earlier if its ex post performance is poor. The gap between SYMTAX and
ASYMTAX NPVs with interest on carryforwards shows that carryforwards have no
value to dead projects. Now if tax law allowed the firm to add a life
insurance premium as well as interest to unused loss carryforwards, the
potential extra burden of tax asymmetries would be essentially eliminated.
The life insurance premium would equal the probability that the.firm
generating the carryforwards would pass away in the next tax year.
4.3. Uncertainty and abandonment.
We conclude with a brief comment on the role of uncertainty and
abandonment strategy in our simulation results.
Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C confirm that the present value of the government's
tax claim on a firm or stand-alone project increases with the risk (standard
deviation) of the firm's or proJect's cash flows. But not all of the
differences between SYMTAX and ASYMTAX NPVs can be attributed to risk. Some
would persist under certainty, simply because the stand-alone project may not
be profitable enough', at least in its early years, to use all of the tax
shields allotted to it.
Panel A of Table 5 gives NPVs when risk disappears. First read across
the row labelled x = . The ZEROTAX NPV is effectively zero. Under Reform
tax assumptions, NPV is about -4 percent of project investment for both a
taxpaying firm (SYATAX) and the stand-alone project. Now read down the
columns under "Reform": as risk increases, there is no change in SYMTAX NPVs
(the small differences reported are due to numerical errors in the Monte Carlo
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simulation), but a steady decrease in after-tax NPVs for the stand-alone
project. At least for projects like those'examined in this paper--projects
with smooth downward trends in operating income--tax asymmetries have
virtually no effect in the absence of risk. They increase the tax burden on
incremental investment'in risky assets but not on investment in safe assets.
The results grouped under "ACRS" in Panel A tell a different story. The
present value of the government's tax claim on the stand-alone project is
about -7 percent of project investment (-7.5 vs. -0.6). The present value of
taxes increases further as risk increases, but clearly the largest part of the
damage done to the ASYMTAX NPVs can be traced to deferral of the stand-alone
project's investment tax credit and ACRS writeoffs.
The NPVs in Panel A of Table 5 were calculated after "turning off" the
option to abandon the project early or to extend its life beyond its optimal
life under certainty. We wanted to show how asymmetric taxation and risk
interact with project life fixed.
Panel B shows what happens when the option is turned on again. The
option sharply increases pre-tax NPVs as risk increases, because the firm can
bail out of the project, recovering part of the initial capital outlay, if ex
post performance is poor, but continue almost indefinitely if performance is
sufficiently good. The option likewise increases after-tax NPVs, even for the
stand-alone project. In other words, additional risk adds more value to the
option to abandon early or extend than it adds to the government's call
options on project cash flows. The government's options still have
significant value, however. For example, when x = .25, they are worth 3
percent of project investment under tax reform (34.2 vs. 31.7) and 6.3 percent
of investment under current law (29.3 vs. 23.0). Note that the latter
difference is less! than the comparable difference for x = 0. Thus, under
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current law, the option to abandon or extend may interact with the
government's call options to reduce the value of those options as risk
increases. That does not, however, affect the main results of this paper,
which rest on comparisons of after-tax NPVs at given risk levels under current
tax law and stylized tax reform. The potential costs and distortions
introduced by tax asymmetries depend on the differences between SYMTAX and
ASYMTAX NPVs at given levels of investment risk. Under current tax law, these
differences are dramatic regardless of risk and regardless of whether the
option to abandon or extend project life is "turned on." Under our stylized
tax reform the differences are much smaller.
4.4. Investment in intangible assets.
Our tax reform is too pure for real life. Many of the impurities of
actual tax reform make the potential costs of tax reform worse. For example,
the results presented so far overstate the difference reform might make
because most reform proposals continue to allow corporations to expense
investment in intangibles. Research and development (R & D) outlays are
expensed, for example, as are most startup costs and advertising, which is
sometimes intended to generate payoffs in the medium or long term.
Under current law, the present values of tax shields generated by
investment in tangible and intangible assets are roughly the same. That is,
the present value of ACRS writeoffs plus the investment tax credit is roughly
equal to the cost of the asset, and therefore roughly equivalent to writing
off the asset when it is bought. High-tech companies that invest largely in
R&D or other intangibles are not materially disadvantaged versus smokestack
companies that invest in tangible capital assets, providing both types of
companies pay taxes year in and year out at the same marginal rate.
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For stand-alone projects, however, shifting investment from tangible to
intangible assets makes the burden of tax asymmetries worse. Moreover, that
burden is carried over to tax reform proposals that allow intangible
investments to be expensed.
In other words, tax reform which sets economically sensible tax
depreciation schedules for tangible assets only will tend to slant investment
towards R&D and other intangibles: high tech companies will gain relative to
smokestack companies as long as both types pay taxes regularly. However, the
potential burden of tax asymmetries on high-tech projects or companies will
remain substantial.
5. Summary
In this paper we combine option pricing theory with Monte Carlo
simulation to derive numerical estimates of the potential effects of tax
asymmetries. We confirm earlier results showing that asymmetries can have
substantial effects on the after-tax NPVs of incremental investment
projects. We go on to a more refined and detailed investigation, comparing
current (1985) law with a stylized reform which eliminates the investment tax
credit and sets tax depreciation approximately equal to economic
depreciation. The reformed marginal corporate tax rate is 33 percent.
This reform would increase the present value of taxes on incremental
investments by firms which always pay taxes, but decrease the present value of
taxes on stand-alone projects. Reform dramatically reduces the potential
burden of tax asymmetries.
The magnitude'of these shifts in tax burden of course depends on
numerical assumptions. However, the direction of the effects holds up over
all of our experiments. The experiments varied risk, the rate of economic
depreciation, and the ratio of fixed to variable cost. We also generated
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results under reform with and without inflation-indexing of tax depreciation,
and with and without interest on tax loss carry forwards. Although these
measures help, they do not completely eliminate the effects of tax
asymmetries.
There is more work to be done. For example, we would like to model
uncertain inflation and develop a better understanding of its effects on value
under asymmetric taxation. We expect our general conclusions to continue to
hold, but this will enable us to make better recommendations regarding
inflation indexing and its likely impact on asset values.
Although our methodology allows us to analyze a wide variety of tax codes
in considerable detail, it requires that the pretax cash flows of the firm or
project are not affected by the tax rules. There are interesting issues
regarding the effect of the tax system on the distributions of future cash
flows that we have not addressed.
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APPENDIX
NUMERICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND DESIGN OF SIMULATIONS
Virtually any a priori belief about the magnitudes of effects of tax
asymmetries might be confirmed by a cleverly constructed numerical example.
Many of these examples would have at least one practical analog somewhere in
the corporate sector.
Because our examples are intended to bring out the general effects of tax
reform on tax asymmetries, a "representative" investment project is called
for. Therefore, our numerical examples start with a base-case investment
project reflecting the implicit assumptions of the stylized tax reform
proposal we concentrate on. We want to avoid results which might be construed
as reflecting our choice of an oddball base-case project. Our base project is
therefore regular and unexceptional.
Project Life Under Certainty
If tax and economic depreciation are exponentially declining, we want
project cash flows to decline in the same way. Ignore taxes, and consider a
project requiring an investment outlay of 1, with expected nominal cash
inflows of yt ' xt - FCt. FCt stands for "fixed cost," but for the
moment we set FCt 0.
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If both the asset value and "variable" cash flow xc decay at the
expected nominal rate 6, project NPV for economic life J-is:
NPV - -1 + e -(r+p+
6)tdt -(r+p+6)H
o
where r is the nominal risk-free interest rate, p a risk premium, r + p
is the expected opportunity cost of capital, and e (r+ 6)H is the present
value of the proceeds from sale of assets at t - H.
Since our simulations take place in a hypothetical risk-neutral world, we
may as well translate immediately to certainty equivalent flows. The decay
rate of the certainty equivalents of xt is 6 6 + p . Discounting at
the risk-free rate r:
- -- (r+6)t -(r+6)H
NPV - -1 + I xe dr + e
0
(A.1)
Since this transformation does not affect NPV or decisions about project life
H, we assume certainty in the following discussion.
The project summarized by (A.1) is nicely consistent, because the value o:
the stream of cash flows st does decline at the assumed rate 6.
However, project or asset life has only a bit part in the story. Remember
that we assume certainty. If NPV > 0, the project would never be
voluntarily shut down; H could only be a date of exogenous physical
collapse. If NPV - 0, the natural base case assumption in a competitive
economy, then dNPV/dH - 0 for any H. In other words, the firm would be
Just as happy to shut down at H 1 as H 100.
f
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We can make project life a more interesting variable by introducing fixed
costs, FCt . Varying FCt will allow us to examine how the tax system
interacts with operating leverage. We also give variable cash flow xt a
possibly different decay rate X.
NPV -1 + e- ( r + 6) H + x-(r+X)tNPV +e + f x0e dt0
FCe-(r-i)tdt
0
p1
+ + (1 - e0 (1 e-
- + (1 -lI e- )H) -
(A.2)
Note that fixed costs are assumed
Assuming initial NPV > 0 at
byl 2 :
dNPV/dH -(r + 6)e - ( r +6 ) H
rHIf one multiplies through by e
and FCH,
to increase at the inflation rate i.
some life H, project life is determined
+ xe-(r+)H _ FCe -(r -)H 0 .
and translates to future values xH
dNPV/dH - xH - FCH - (r + 6)SVH 0
where SVH is asset value at H. In other words, the project continues as
long as the cash inflow xt exceeds the fixed cost FCt plus the
opportunity cost of waiting a little longer for SV. The opportunity cost
of waiting is the time value of money r plus the continuing depreciation
rate 6.
Now imagine a tax Czar who models firm's investment decisions as in (A.2)
and who wishes to assign economically sensible depreciation rates and
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(A.3)
I1
depreciable lives to various asset classes. Asset lives depend on- 6, X,
FC0 and 0; x0 is our index of profitability. The Czar would take
6 and as determined in product and factor markets. Competition would
force profitability towards the level x0 at which NPV - 0. Then, given
operating leverage (FC0), asset life would be determined by (A.3).1 3
The starting point for each of our numerical experiments is consistent
with this story. We pick pairs of 6 and depreciable life that roughly
14
correspond to those in the initial Treasury tax reform proposal. For each
pair, various initial levels of fixed costs are assumed. For each fixed cost
level, the initial level x0 and decay rate X of cash inflows are set
so that NPV 0 and optimal project life H equals the depreciable life
originally assumed. A numerical example is given in Table A.1.
These base case projects are only the starting points for our experiments,
which calculate how the present value of the firm's tax liability depends on
profitability levels, cash flow variances, the option to end the project early
or late, and of course, on the specific tax rules.
Taxes and Project Life
Suppose the firm always pays taxes at the marginal rate . Under
stylized tax reform:
H i)e-(r+6 )t -(r+6)H
NPV - - + f T( 6 + e dt+ e
0
(A.4)
+ (-(r+X)dt- (1H -(r-i)dtf (1- )xe dt - f (1- T)FC 0e dt
0 0
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Present value of asset at t - H. Since asset
values equal tax book value throughout, no tax
is paid at the end of project life.
H -(r+6)t
0
The present value of tax depreciation.1 5 The
depreciation rate is expressed in real terms
as (6 + i). Think of this as indexed
depreciation: higher inflation would be
reflected in a higher r and a smaller 6,
i.e., in slower, possibly negative, decay of
nominal asset values. However, higher
inflation should not reduce tax depreciation
as a fraction of nominal asset value. Thus,
we add inflation back to keep the depreciation
rate in real terms.
By the way, the present value of non-indexed depreciation is:
H
f (6 + i)e-(r+ 6+i)tdt
0
In this case, tax depreciation charges decline at the real rate (6 + i)
even though inflation is positive and reflected in the nominal discount rate.
The tax rules embodied in Eq. (A.3) describe the "reformed" tax system to
be compared to current (1985) law. The only rule not apparent from Eq. (A.3)
is the treatment of remaining book value at H; we assume it is written off as
a final, lump-sum depreciation allowance.
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where:
e-(r+6)H
II
The NPV formula with taxes (A.4) simplifies to:
+ (1-)X 1-e
NPV - l-e ( r +6 ) H ] 1- + r+ 1-()H ]
(A.5)
(1-i)FC
.... r- 0 [ 1 -e-(r-i)H 1
The condition for optimal project life is:
dNPV/dH - xH - F - SVH(r+6)[ -( 6 +i)/(r+ 6 ) (A.6)
In this setup, the "tax term" in brackets tends to shorten project life. 1 6
However, we do not assume that the tax Czar takes tax effects such as this
into account in setting depreciation rates or asset life classes. For our
experiments, we define depreciation rates, asset lives, etc., in terms of
pre-tax cash flows.
Optimal Abandonment
When a project description such as that given in Table A.1 is handed to
the Monte Carlo simulation, the assumption of a fixed project life H is left
behind. Project life may be cut short if cash flows xt are sufficiently
bad, or extended beyond H if they are sufficiently good. The maximum
project life is set far beyond H, at t - 100.
The option to choose project life can be modelled as a long-lived American
put, with varying exercise price, written on an asset with a varying dividend
yield. 17 The asset is the present value of future project cash flows xt,
assuming those cash flows will continue to evolve stochastically out to the
far distant future. When the put is exercised, subsequent cash flows are
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given up in exchange for the exercise price. In our examples, exercise price
at t equals SVt, asset value at t, plus the present value at t of
subsequent fixed costs, which are avoided by abandoning.
The optimal exercise strategy for the put gives the decision rule for
choosing project life, and the value of the put, usually labelled "abandoment
value," is incorporated in adjusted project value.18
Adjusted . NPV with no + Abandonment
NPV abandonment (put) value
Abandonment value and the optimal abandonment strategy are calculated
numerically1 9 using pretax cash flows. It would be nice to explore how
taxation affects the abandonment decision, but the computational problems seem
overwhelming once tax loss carry-backs and carry-forwards are introduced. For
example, including carry priviledges in the put valuation program would
require at least two additional state variables, one for tax paid in the
previous three periods, and another for tax loss carryforwards. Some partial
analyses of how tax asymmetries interact with project life seem feasible, but
we must leave them for further work.
Summary
The procedures used in our numerical experiments may thus be summed up as
follows.
1. Choose an asset class described by a depreciation rate 6 and a
prespecified asset life. Assume an investment outlay of 1.
2. For various levels of operating leverage, measured by initial fixed
cost FCO, pick the initial cash inflow x0 and its decay rate so
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that project NPV - 0 and H, the optimal abandonment date under certainty,
matches the prespecified life for the asset class. This step sets the decay
rate and assures that there is an initial cash flow level consistent
with NPV - 0 at the assumed fixed life H.
3. Pick a variance rate a for the cash flow realizations xtx
and calculate optimal abandonment strategy and abandonment values. The
abandonment strategy does not depend on the initial value x0, although the
abandonment value does. 20
4. Calculate the after-tax present value of the project for different
levels of x0 under whatever tax rules are being investigated, assuming
that project life is terminated by the abandonment strategy calculated in
Step 3. (For a few runs step 3 was "turned off" to check that our qualitative
results stand when project life is fixed.)
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TABLE 1: Project net present value as a percent of initial investment.
Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric
tax with and without carry provisions (ASYMTAX and
NOCARRY), for a range of pre-tax profitability (ZEROTAX).
The parameters for the calculations correspond to the base
case described in the Appendix.
ZEROTAX
-25.03
-19.86
-14.49
-5.32
7.97
20.54
36.93
60.22
Reform (indexed)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-17.46
-14.00
-10.45
-5.02
3.21
11.32
22.06
37.45
-25.03
-19.86
-14.66
-8.02
1.05
9.85
21.10
36.98
NOCARRY I
I
-25.03
-19.86
-14.71
-8.79
-0.32
8.19
19.33
35.05
.·- --·- r-'- -
1l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
TABLE Al
Numerical Example of a Base-Case Project
Variable definitions
Yt ' pre-tax cash flow - revenue - variable cost - fixed cost
xt ' revenue - variable cost, which decays at the nominal rate X
FCt - fixed costs, which increase at the inflation rate i
r - nominal risk-free interest rate
SVt - asset values. SV0 - 1, the initial outlay. SVt decays at
the nominal rate 6
02 * variance rate of the realized cash flows xt
H - optimal project life under certainty
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Base case values
z0 - .259
FC - .1
H - 12
A - .002
6 ' .12
r - .08
i - .06
ao - .15
X
Note: in real terms, cash flows decline at X + i - .062 per year.
Calculate NPV and check project life
NPV -1 + e-(r+6)H + O (1-e -(r+X)H
r+X
FCO (le-(ri)H)
r-i
(A.6)
' - 1 + .0907 + 1.9778 - 1.0669 - 0
dNPV/dH - H - FCH - (r+6)SVH - 0
- .2529 - .2054 - .0474 - 0
Abandonment Value
With a - .15, and H - a, the NPV of the project with no
abandonment is -2.84. The value of the abandonment put with last exercise
date at t - 100, is +3.13. Thus adjusted NPV (APV) is:
APV - NPV + abandonment value
- -2.84 + 3.13 - .29.
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NPV without abandonment and H 12 is zero. Thus APV - +.29 is
entirely due to the option to end the project before t ' 12 or to extend it
to t ' 13, 14,..., or 100.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This paper develops previous work, Majd and Myers (1985). Comments on
that paper from Alan Auerbach, Henry Jacoby, Michael Keen and Colin Mayer
have significantly improved this paper.
2. See, for example, Brennan (1979) and Rubinstein (1976).
3. Since the value of a call option is convex in the exercise price (see
Merton (1973)), and no interest is paid on carry forwards, it is always
optimal to use tax losses as soon as possible.
4. Boyle (1977) first used a Monte Carlo simulation technique to value a
European call option on a dividend-paying stock.
5. See Myers and Turnbull (1977) and Fama (1977).
6. Constantinedes (1983) sets forth the conditions for a tax-paying entity
to realize tax losses immediately and to defer gains as long as possible.
7. Tax loss carryforwards cannot be "sold" at face value via financial
leases, for example. A firm with carryforwards can sell tax depreciation
deductions to a taxable lessor, but the lessor has to pay taxes on the
lease payments received. The net gain to lessee plus lessor occurs only
because tax depreciation is accelerated relative to the lease payments.
See Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976). Even if the firm with carryforwards
(lessee) captures the full net gain of the lease contract, it cannot
capture what the depreciation tax shields would be worth to a taxable
corporation.
8. Issuing equity to buy bonds will only be effective under certain
assumptions about debt and taxes. See Cooper and Franks (1983) for a
discussion of some of the financial transactions designed to exploit the
firm's tax losses.
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9. The percentages of firms with carryforwards is shown in Auerbach and
Poterba's Table 1. The percentages are much smaller when weighted by the
market value of equity, since firms with carryforwards tend to be small
and poorly performing. The transition probabilities are from their Table
7.
10. Our simulations of the stand-alone project show the maximum impact for
tax asymmetries on incremental projects undertaken by a going concern.
That is, the after-tax NPV of the stand-alone project is not reduced, and
generally increased, by adding it to other assets subject to corporate
tax. We make this statement based on simulations in Majd and Myers
(1985).
11. Interpret H as a precommitted shutdown date. Firms do not precommit, but
present value calculations usually assume they do. We relax this
assumption in.the abandonment analysis described below.
12. Second-order conditions are satisfied in our examples.
13. The story now has some latent inconsistencies. First, as we will show,
taxes may affect asset values and lives. Second, we have not shown that
second-hand asset values would actually decline at a regular rate 6 when
FCt > 0. They would do so only if we introduced intangible assets, or at
least assets which are not depreciable for tax purposes.
14. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth, V. 2, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, November 1984, ch. 8.01.
15. Depreciation tax shields should be discounted at r(1 - ), the after-tax
riskless rate, since they are safe nominal flows under symmetric
taxation. See Ruback (1986). Thus, we have overstated the burden of a
symmetric tax. We accept this bias to ensure comparability with the
risk-neutral option valuation framework used in our simulation. The pre-
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tax risk-free rate is standard in that framework. We are not certain
that it should be when a long or short position on an option is held
directly by a corporation, rather than by investors in its securities.
For now, we can only note this as an open issue.
16. We would hardly claim this as a general result. For example, taxes would
have no effect on project life providing depreciation is completed before
H. (This is common under current law.) The present value of
depreciation tax shields is then a "sunk" benefit and does not depend on
H; all tax terms cancel out of the derivative.
17. See Myers and Majd (1985). The dividend yield is just project cash flow
Xt divided by the present value in t of expected subsequent cash flows
Xt+l, xt+2, . . . As in the Myers-Majd paper, the assumption is that
yield depends only on time, not on the outcomes x, xl, . . . , xt.
18. NPV with no abandonment is calculated on an underlying asset which lives
to t 100, substantially greater than the optimal life under
certainty. Thus, NPV with no abandonment is less than NPV from (A.2).
Abandonment value more than makes up for this shortfall, so that Adjusted
NPV exceeds NPV at the fixed life H. See Table Al for an example.
19. The numerical procedure differs in three ways from that used in Myers and
Majd (1985). First, the uncertain cash flows xt are modelled as a
process with monthly (t/12) binomial umps. Second, the present value of
remaining fixed costs is rolled into the exercise price. The Myers-Majd
paper ignored fixed costs. Third, abandonment is not allowed before
month 13.
Accuracy of the abandonment value calculations was checked by comparing
present results to results from the method used in Myers and Majd, and by
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computing abandonment values numerically for special cases for which
closed-form solutions are available.
20. The value of the option to extend project life is overstated in our
simulations because we have not forced the firm to make replacement
investments. The decision to finally bail out is determined solely by
the downward trend of "variable" cash flow relative to fixed cost.
However, this should not affect the relative sizes of pre-tax and after-
tax NPVs holding initial profitability and risk constant.
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TABLE 2: Project net present value as a percent of initial investment.
Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric
tax with carry provisions (ASYMTAX) and their difference
(DIFF), for a range of pre-tax profitability (ZEROTAX).
Each panel corresponds to different levels of project risk
(sigma) and compares a stylized tax reform (with indexed
depreciation) to current law (ACRS).
Base Case (sigma - 0.15)
s-aswOIIIIPIPs===sesIt===
Reform (indexed)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-17.46
-14.00
-10.45
-5.02
3.21
11.32
22.06
37.45
-25.03
-19.86
-14.66
-8.02
1.05
9.85
21.10
36.98
DIFF
7.57
5.86
4.21
3.00
2.16
1.47
0.96
0.47
ACRS
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-9.60
-6.81
-4.05
-0.89
4.76
11.01
19.48
31.83
-25.03
-19.86
-14.74
-9.40
-2.17
5.16
14.78
28.46
Low Risk (sigma 0.10)
sass wsts ==  ==== ss=
Reforf (indexed)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-17.46
-14.00
-10.53
-6.93
-2.31
4.07
13.58
28.22
-25.03
-19.86
-14.68
-9.46
-3.95
3.06
13.09
28.05
DIFF
7.57
5.86
4.15
2.53
1.64
1.01
0.49
0.17
ACRS
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-9.60
-6.81
-4.01
-1.57
0.85
5.27
12.66
24.39
-25.03
-19.86
-14.68
-9.81
-5.82
-0.35
8.12
21.14
High Risk (sigma 0.25)
IIIIII,==.sss======s===
Reform (indexed)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-17.46
-13.87
-9.25
4.27
18.35
28.48
42.14
59.67
-25.03
-19.82
-14.39
0.05
15.01
25.82
40.05
58.19
DIFF
7.57
5.95
5.14
4.22
3.34
2.66
2.09
1.48
ACRS
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-9.60
-6.79
-3.93
5.78
16.73
24.74
35.67
1 49.74
-25.03
-19.93
-15.44
-3.74
8.76
18.02
30.11
45.51
ZEROTAX
-25.03
-19.86
-14.49
-5.32
7.97
20.54
36.93
60.22
DIFF I
15.43 1
13.05 1
10.69 1
8.51 1
6.93 1
5.85 1
4.70
3.37 1
ZEROTAX
-25.03
-19.86
-14.67
-8.94
-0.76
9.63
24.37
46.59
DIFF I
15.43
13.05
10.67
8.24
6.67
5.62
4.54
3.25
ZEROTAX
-25.03
-19.59
-12.04
9.26
30.81
46.17
66.76
93.14
DIFF I
15.43 I
13.14 1
11.51 I
9.52 1
7.97 I
6.72 1
5.56 1
4.23 1
s ,~· I - - -- - e . -
-
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
TABLE 3: Project net present value as a percent of initial investment.
Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric
tax with carry provisions (ASYMTAX) and their difference
(DIFF), for a range of pre-tax profitability (ZEROTAX).
Each panel corresponds to different levels of inflation (i),
and compares a stylized tax reform (without indexed
depreciation) to current law (ACRS).
Base Case (i - 0.06)
BSI..SmtSSBwtm...=t
Reform (not indexed)
SYNTAX ASYMTAX
-19.32
-15.86
-12.42
-8.47
-1.60
5.92
16.23
31.25
-25.03
-19.86
-14.72
-9.30
-1.93
5.76
16.15
31.23
DIFF
5.71
4.00
2.30
0.83
0.33
0.16
0.08
0.02
ACRS
SYNTAX ASYMTAX
-9.60
-6.81
-4.05
-0.89
4.76
11.01
19.48
31.83
-25.03
-19.86
-14.74
-9.40
-2.17
5.16
14.78
28.46
No Inflation (i - 0)
Reform (not indexed)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX DIFF
-17.46
-14.00
-10.46
-5.00
3.68
11.31
21.76
37.23
-25.02
-19.86
-14.67
-8.00
1.57
9.85
20.87
36.83
7.56
5.86
4.21
3.00
2.11
1.46
0.89
0.40
ACRS
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-6.79
-4.00
-1.14
3.32
10.42
16.65
25.17
37.74
-25.02
-19.86
-14.68
-8.16
0.98
8;97
19.37
34.17
High Inflation (i - 0.12)
was ..... ,sssw. ,s,.s===
Reform (not indexed)
SYNTAX ASYMTAX
-21.09
-17.62
-14.27
-10.96
-4.17
2.39
11.96
27.53
-25.05
-19.86
-14.92
-11.28
-4.40
2.26
11.91
27.52
DIFF
3.96
2.24
0.65
0.32
0.23
0.13
0.05
0.01 I
ACRS
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-12.26
-9.46
-6.79
-4.34
1.10
6.48
14.41
27.18
-25.05
-19.86
-14.85
-10.57
-4.39
1.51
10.16
23.97
ZEROTAX
-25.03
-19.86
-14.49
-5.32
7.97
20.54
36.93
60.22
DIFF I
15.43 1
13.05 1
10.69 1
8.51 1
6.93 1
5.85 1
4.70 1
3.37 1
ZEROTAX
-25.02
-19.86
-14.49
-5.21
8.72
20.54
36.49
59.88
DIFF I
18.23 1
15.86 1
13.54 1
11.48 1
9.44 1
7.68 1
5.80 1
3.57 I
ZEROTAX
-25.05
-19.86
-14.54
-5.25
9.29
20.90
36.57
60.96
DIFF I
12.79 I
10.40 I
8.06 I
6.23 I
5.49 I
4.97 1
4.25 I
3.21 1
-
_ _ 
_ _
-
TABLE 4: Project net present value as a percent of initial investment.
Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric
tax with carry provisions (ASYMTAX), and their difference
(DIFF) for a range of pre-tax profitability (ZEROTAX).
Each panel corresponds to different levels of inflation (i),
and compares the stylized tax reform (with indexed deprec-
iation) with and without interest in carryforwards.
Base Case (i - 0.06)
ssss==3ss====s=====e
Reform (with interest)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX DIFF
-17.46
-14.00
-10.45
-5.02
3.21
11.32
22.06
37.45
-25.03
-19.86
-14.65
-7.91
1.19
9.98
21.19
37.05
7.57
5.86
4.20
2.89
2.02
1.34
0.87
0.40
Reform (without interest)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-17.46
-14.00
-10.45
-5.02
3.21
11.32
22.06
37.45
-25.03
-19.86
-14.66
-8.02
1.05
9.85
21.10
36.98
DIFF
7.57
5.86
4.21
3.00
2.16
1.47
0.96
0.47
No Inflation (i 0)
=====mm =mms==== =
Reform (with interest)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX DIFF
-17.46
-14.00
-10.46
-5.00
3.68
11.31
21.76
37.23
-25.02
-19.86
-14.67
-7.97
1.62
9.89
20.90
36.85
7.56
5.86
4.21
2.97
2.06
1.42
0.86
0.38
Reform (without
SYMTAX ASYMTAX
-17.46
-14.00
-10.46
-5.00
3.68
11.31
21.76
37.23
-25.02
-19.86
-14.67
-8.00
1.57
9.85
20.87
36.83
High Inflation (i - 0.12)
IsPsIIDIPIIDIIs=========
ZEROTAX I
-25.05
-19.86
-14.54
-5.25
9.29
20.90
36.57
60.96
Reform (with interest)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX DIFF
-17.48
-14.00
-10.48
-4.92
4.12
11.60
21.84
37.96
-25.05
-19.86
-14.68
-7.70
2.23
10.26
21.04
37.57
7.57
5.86
4.20
2.78
1.89
1.34
0.80
0.39
Reform (without interest)
SYMTAX ASYMTAX DIFF
-17.48
-14.00
-10.48
-4.92
4.12
11.60
21.84
37.96
-25.05
-19.86
-14.68
-7.86
2.01
10.07
20.90
37.47
7.57
5.86
4.20
2.94
2.11
1.53
0.94 1
0.49 1
ZEROTAX
-25.03
-19.86
-14.49
-5.32
7.97
20.54
36.93
60.22
ZEROTAX
-25.02
-19.86
-14.49
-5.21
8.72
20.54
36.49
59.88
interest)
DIFF
7.56
5.86
4.21
3.00
2.11
1.46
0.89
0.40
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
! _ _ _
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ _
l
Table 5
Effects of uncertainty and abandonment strategy on pre-tax and after-tax NPVs
NPV as percent of project investment. Ini-
tial profitability and other project assump-
tions are given in Table A1.
A. NPVs with project life fixed at 12 years.
Reform ACRS
ax NOTAXb SYMTAXb ASYMTAX SYMTAXb ASYMTAX
.Oa -0.6 -3.7 -3.7 -1.2 -7.5
.15 0.3 -3.1 -8.6 -0.7 -17.1
.25 1.2 -2.4 -12.5 -0.2 -17.1
B. NPVs with option to abandon before year 12 or to extend life
to year 100.
Reform ACRS
ax NOTAXb SYMTAXb ASYMTAX SYMTAXb ASYMTAX
.Oa -0.6 -3.7 -3.7 -1.2 -7.5
.15 26.8 15.4 14.1 14.2 8.8
.25 54.8 34.2 31.7 29.3 23.0
a We actually used ax .001 in the Monte Carlo simulation. Note that the
option to abandon early or extend project life become valueless as
ox . O. Thus the figures in the first row of each panel are the same.
b The results in these columns should in principle be identical.
Differences reflect numerical errors introduced by the Monte Carlo
simulation.
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Figure 1. Taxes paid as a function of taxable income.
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Figure 2: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform with indexed
depreciation. The parameters are for the base case described in the
Appendix.
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Figure 3a: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform with indexed
depreciation versus ACRS. The parameters are for the base case described
in the Appendix.
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* Figure 3b: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform with indexed
depreciation versus ACRS, when cash flow volatility is 10% (other parameters
are for the base dase described in the Appendix).
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Figure 3c: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform with indexed
depreciation versus ACRS, when cash flow volatility is 25% (other parameters
are for the base case described in the Appendix).
-10 10 30
Pre-tax NPV
D zerotax + symtax (reform) 0 asymtax (reform)
b, symtax (acrs) X asymtax (acrs)
40
30
C
0
E
0
C
,
L
0
z
to
20
10
0
-10
-2
-30
key:
-31
Figure 4a: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform without indexed
depreciation versus ACRS. The parameters are for the base case described
in the Appendix.
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* Figure 4b: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform without indexed
depreciation versus ACRS, when inflation is 0% (other parameters are for the
base case described in the Appendix).
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Figure 4c: Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform without indexed
depreciation verius ACRS, when inflation is 12Z (other parameters are for the
base case described in the Appendix).
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Figure 5: Project.NPV as a function of pretax NPV: Reform (with indexed
depreciation) with and without interest on.carry forwards. The parameters
are for the base case described in the Appendix.
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